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Abstract: 
This paper develops a new explanation for the emergence of large European holding 
groups that typically control many of the largest companies of their country.  These 
holding groups usually consist of (sometimes many) non-holding firms (i.e. industrial 
companies, banks,  ... ) with layers of holding companies on top. The holding firms  in 
these  layers  may  or may  not be  publicly  quoted  and  often  show  a  very  intricate 
ownership structure, characterised by inter-group connections, intra-group cascading 
mixed with parallel placement of holding firms,  cross ownership and diverse intra-
group links. So far no explanation for these complicated structures has been proposed. 
This paper offers a rationale for this phenomenon. It shows that if ownership is used 
as  a device to develop certain decision power configurations over non-holding firms, 
holding groups with the features  described above develop.  Specifically, drawing on 
European corporate law, it is shown that multi-holding structures with observed inter-
group connections develop as  a response to the need for a flexible renegotiation free 
co-operation mechanism. It is also shown that when this co-operation mechanism is 
placed under the pressure of capital constraints, complicated intra-group ownership 
patterns are likely to arise. The paper also investigates the interaction between holding 
firms  and  shareholder  syndicate  contracts  (considered  to  be  very  important  in 
European  corporate  governance)  and,  next  to  rationalizing  observed  holding 
structures, it also formulates some additional testable hypothesis about these groups. 
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* Katholieke Universiteit Leuven In Continental Europe corporate ownership is  typically concentrated.  It is  well known 
that in Italy, Belgium and Sweden a few  large holding groups control - or at least have 
influence in - most of the important companies on the stock exchange (see e.g. Baums, 
Buxbaum, Hopt (1994), Gerson (1992), Van Overstraeten (1994)). Although the situation 
is not as extreme in France, holding groups like Suez and Paribas control several of the 
largest French companies and/or belong to their 'noyaux durs' (= hard core of large and 
controlling block holders).  Important holding  groups  are present in  other Continental 
European countries too, for example in Spain (e.g.  TENEO) , Portugal (e.g.  RAR - So-
ciedade  di  Controle)  and Denmark (e.g.  Accumulator - Invest  AJS).  A  large  holding 
group often consists  of layers  of publicly quoted and non quoted holding  companies, 
placed on top of the non-holding firms  (i.e.  the industrial companies, banks,  .... ).  Fur-
thermore the ownership structure of the holding firms within these layers usually is quite 
intricate  (see  appendix  A  for  examples).  In  particular,  holding  firms  frequently  own 
shares (large or small blocks) in holding firms controlled by other groups. Within groups, 
cascading (= a string of holding firms in which each company controls the next one in the 
line)  combined with parallel placement of holding companies  and diverse intra-group 
links, frequently turn large holding groups into spaghetti-like structures. Finally, adding 
to the general picture of opaqueness, control over the large publicly quoted non-holding 
firms is frequently also shared between different groups. Overall, these ownership distri-
butions contrast sharply with the dispersed and direct corporate ownership that is domi-
nant in Anglo-Saxon Countries. This suggests that, contrary to the Anglo-Saxon world, 
in  European  firms,  ownership  is  used  as  a  tool  to  design  decision-power  structures. 
Hence an understanding of European governance implies an understanding of how this 
tool functions. 
This paper shows that if holding firms  are used as  a device to develop certain decision 
power configurations over non-holding firms, holding groups with the features described 
above, arise. In particular, it is shown that multi-holding structures with inter-group own-
ership are  created when holding firms  are used as  a renegotiation-free private enforce-
ment mechanism to organize co-operation among companies (or different parties). The 
paper also shows conditions under which this enforcement may take the form of different 
groups sharing ownership in the non-holding firms. Furthermore it is shown that the use 
of holding firms  solely for  enforcement purposes, need not generate much intra-group 
ownership. However it is shown that a renegotiation-free eqUilibrium under pressure of 
sufficiently stringent capital constraints, produces inter and intra-group ownership with 
greatly varying block size, as well as overall intricate intra-group ownership patterns. In 
addition the paper analyzes the interaction between holding structures  and shareholder 
syndicate contracts (i.e. private agreements among large shareholders; these are generally 2 
considered to play an important role in European corporate governance). Finally the pa-
per also discusses those features in European corporate law that turn holding firms into 
such excellent vehicles for solving renegotiation problems. 
Explanations for the emergence of simple holding groups have been proposed in the past. 
In particular, by setting up  a holding firm,  dilution of ownership can be avoided (e.g. 
keep together the family fortune). In turn, this concentration of financial resources, facili-
tates  maintaining  large  ownership  blocks  in  non-holding  firms.  Hence  other classical 
motives for the creation of holding companies are monitoring and diversification (see for 
example  Daems  (1978)).  Obviously  these  rationales  do  not  explain  the  complicated 
multi-holding  group  patterns  described earlier.  The last classical rationale for  holding 
firms is tax avoidance. However it is hard to imagine that the currently observed compli-
cated structures  of large  holding  groups,  are  a simple response  to  tax  laws.  First,  in 
Europe, over the last few  decades, holding firms have become increasingly tax neutral. 
Second, over the same time period, to stop capital flight, governments have been creating 
special legal forms designed to avoid efficiently corporate and/or some types of personal 
taxes (e.g.  co-ordination centers, distribution centers, mutual funds  with special tax ad-
vantages). This of course does  not imply that holdings would no  longer engage in tax 
management. According to practitioners, some of the holdings in a group still serve tax 
purposes, while others are vestiges from tax management in earlier periods, when hold-
ing firms were less tax neutral. However these firms would usually be 100% subsidiaries 
of the  group,  and  hence  it is  questionable  that  'tax'  -holding  companies  explain  the 
complicated ownership structures we observe (see also Leleux, Vermaelen and Banerjee 
(1995) for a discussion of opportunities and limitations of tax savings by French holding 
firms). 
It is useful to compare the European holding groups to the Japanese keiretsu and, perhaps 
surprisingly, to the United States Congress. Although at first glance, holding group own-
ership distributions remind of ownership in Japanese companies, the holding group phe-
nomenon is quite different. In Japan holding groups were abolished at the end of World 
War 2.  Since then a myriad of cross ownership between industrial firms with common 
business  interests  has  materialized (see for  example Berglof and Perotti (1994),  Miy-
ashita and  Russell  (1994)).  Similarly to Berglof and Perotti (1994)'s rationale for  the 
cross ownership between Japanese industrial companies, this paper views holding firms 
as self-enforcing mechanisms. However the way this mechanism functions with holding 
firms is very different. Whereas in Berglof and Perotti the results are driven by the threat 
of the formation of a majority coalition that ousts non-abiding participants, the holding 
structures are designed to rule out recoalitioning and opportunities for ousting a party. In 3 
contrast,  the  logic  of the  holding  system  as  an  enforcement  mechanism  is  strikingly 
similar to the logic of the organization of Congress in the United States. Weingast and 
Marshall (1988) analyze the way in which US  congressmen structure renegotiation-free 
agreements in the face  of non-contemporaneous benefit flows  and the impossibility of 
current  legislators  to  bind  a  future  legislative  session.  The  renegotiation  problem  is 
solved by the creation of committees with a specific jurisdiction and  veto power over 
Congress's agenda within the committee's jurisdiction. Therefore, politicians belonging to 
other committees, can never revoke benefits belonging to a certain committee's jurisdic-
tion, unless this committee agrees to place these issues on the Congress's voting agenda. 
More generally, Weingast and Marshall show that a system of well defined veto power 
over specific issues helps solving problems of non-contemporaneous flows  and ex-post 
renegotiation. Similarly to the US  Congress committees, holding firms may be endowed 
with special super-majority arrangements to give a specific party veto power over well 
defined  issues.  By  appropriately  structuring  the  ownership  pattern  within  a  holding 
group, this veto power may be organized to deal with renegotiation problems arising in 
co-operations.  It may  also  solve renegotiation  problems  that  arise  when  the  circle  of 
shareholders is broadened to  overcome capital constraints.  Simultaneously, the holding 
group may be structured to allow for reorganizations without the need for consent from 
all other 'committees' (such a general consent would be necessary in the case of US Con-
gress), while the renegotiation-free enforcement features are kept intact. 
The idea of holding firms  serving as  a blocking device is  well known to specialists in 
corporate  law  (e.g.  Ralet  (1988),  Schrans  and  Wymeersch  (1991)).  However  to  our 
knowledge, the possibility to turn holding structures into renegotiation-free enforcement 
mechanisms has  never been systematically analyzed,  nor have the implications for the 
structuring of holding groups  been explored.  The present paper also  differs  from  the 
work of Gerson (1992) on South African holding groups as the latter does not address the 
idea of holding firms serving as  an enforcement device, nor the issue of intra and inter-
group ownership patterns. 
The paper is organized as  follows. Section 1 presents and solves the renegotiation prob-
lem. The solution of this section considers 3 actors and presumes either no or only lim-
ited capital constraints. Section 2 extends the solution to many actors. Section 3 consid-
ers two-sided capital constraints and section 4 compares holding firms  with alternative 
solutions to renegotiation issues. Finally section 5 offers some conclusions. 4 
1. HOW DOES THE SYSTEM WITH HOLDING FIRMS FUNCTION? 
1.1. Problem definition 
Holding structures are a very rich and complex subject. To cope with the complexity and 
simultaneously keep as much as possible from the richness of the subject, this paper uses 
an open-ended model of a one period renegotiation problem as  a benchmark for the ar-
guments. In this model, at time 0, company X has the opportunity to engage into two in-
dependent co-operation opportunities, one with company 1 and one with company 2. In 
this  paper 'independence' implies that the projects are not mutually exclusive and that 
projects do not influence each other. Initially company X is  fully owned by its manager 
MX.l Similarly companies 1 and 2 are managed by their respective owners M 1 and M2. 
The co-operation opportunity requires that between time °  and time 1, firms  1 and 2 in-
dependently provide firm X with some input. For example, by transferring some know 
how to company X, firms  1 and 2 could use firm X's marketing channels. At time 1, co-
operations 1 and 2 generate benefits Bland B2 respectively. These benefits are uncertain 
at time °  and, for simplicity, are presumed to take the form of private benefits. Further-
more, at time 1, Bland B2 are fully realized through company X while benefit amounts 
are not observable to  outsiders. Hence unless M 1 (M2)  has  acquired some negotiation 
power at time 1, it will receive nothing. Consequently to convince M 1 (M2) to step into 
the co-operation, MX needs a credible precomrnitment to share B 1 (B2)? However the 
realization of B 1 (B2) is associated with an event E 1 (E2) that materializes with certainty 
at time 1 and that is observable to outsiders. However E 1 (E2) does not contain informa-
tion about the exact realization of B 1 (B2)' Continuing the example of the use of market-
ing channels, one could think of E 1 (E2)  as  any decision by the board of directors of 
company X related to the co-operation with firm 1 (2). The minutes of the board meeting 
could be brought in court as evidence that event El (E2) has occurred. In fact, if, as will 
always  be  the  case in  the  solutions  discussed below,  M 1 (M2)  is  represented on  the 
board, it can make certain that this topic gets on the board's agenda. For simpiicity it is 
also presumed that Eland E2 do not overlap. It will turn out that, next to certain rules of 
corporate law discussed below, this event will be very helpful in setting up a precom-
mitment device. Next to Bl and B2, firm X also produces  'general' private benefits BX 
that are entirely pocketed by MX,  at least as  long as  the latter has general control over 
company X.  It is presumed that BX > B 1 (B2) (i.e. the benefits of control generated by 
I In France and Belgium Mx is called 'actionnaire de reference' . 
2 If  the co-operation would involve a one shot transaction, MX could solve the problem by simply paying 
the present value of the estimated benefits at the time that M 1  (M2)provide the input. However, if the op-
portunity involves a sustained co-operation effort (e.g. because it may affect the competitive conditions in 
the product market in which the parties operate as long as the co-operation lasts) or if the benefits are very 
hard to estimate, this alternative is not a feasible solution and a credible precommitment device is needed. 5 
company X are more important than the benefits  of control from some co-operation). 
After the distribution of all benefits, firms are disbanded. 
At time 0, the precommitment device is set up by MX, M 1 and M2. It will turn out that 
holding structures  offer the  most  suitable solution.  Normally  the  particular choice  of 
structure will be the outcome of negotiations. However, as  it would only result in one 
special example or subclass of holding group, this paper does not identify a specific ne-
gotiation process. Rather this paper's approach consists in identifying the basic building 
blocks of a group (i.e. holding firms placed in parallel or in cascade), investigating these 
building blocks'  main properties  and  analyzing  the  reasons  for  combining  these  into 
complicated structures.  Similarly,  the findings  in  this  paper do  not require  a  detailed 
specification of the bargaining at time 1, except that only a party with negotiation power 
receives a share of the benefits. Furthermore, as capital constraints are to play an impor-
tant role, this paper presumes that it is not possible to circumvent these constraints cos-
tlessly by cascading a sufficient number of publicly quoted holding firms. In particular, in 
conformity with empirical evidence, it is assumed that publicly floated shares of holding 
firms  sell at a discount (see for example Gerson (1992), Siaens and Walravens (1993), 
Eurostaf (1992)). This discount comes on top of, and is different from the well known 
underpricing during an initial public offering. This paper presumes that this discount rep-
resents a real loss that firm owners wish to avoid. One reason why such a discount could 
arise,  also  in  a rational world,  is the impossibility of credible precommit towards  the 
public  shareholders  (e.g.  Gerson  (1992)).  If precommitment would produce  a Pareto-
improvement, the discount caused by lack of precommitment possibilities, represents a 
loss in welfare that firm owners bear. Other reasons can readily be found in the literature 
on closed-end funds. This paper's discussion also takes into account two more practical 
aspects: dynamic dimensions of the renegotiation problem (i.e.  section 2.2.  and 3.2. be-
low) and some information issues (i.e. section 3.1. and 3.2.). Finally, in view of the im-
portance of family corporate ownership in Europe, it should be remarked that the above 
problem could just as  easily have been formulated in terms of a co-operation between 
family members. 
1.2. The renegotiation problem and Continental European corporate law. 
This  section  considers  the  main  legal  rules  that  turn  holding  firms,  supplemented by 
shareholder syndicate  agreements,  into prime  candidates  for  solving the  renegotiation 
problem discussed above. In particular, generally there is  a consensus in corporate law 
that three basic elements are necessary for a company to function: the company itself as a 6 
separate legal entity,  the board of directors  and the shareholders? In most Continental 
European  countries  (e.g.  Belgium,  France,  Italy,  Portugal,  Spain,  Luxembourg, 
Greece  ... ), companies are governed by a one-tier board system. That is, one board of di-
rectors,  chosen  by the  shareholders,  monitors  management.  In some  cases  a  two-tier 
board system is legally imposed on large firms  (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Denmark and Sweden). This system features two boards with different tasks, and in one 
of them a minimal number of seats may be reserved for labor representatives (obligatory 
representation of labor occurs in Germany and the Netherlands).4 This paper considers 
only one-tier boards. In this latter system, in Continental Europe, boards seats are usually 
assigned to  the large  shareholders, in proportion to  share ownership  (e.g.  see Baums, 
Buxbaum, Hopt (1994».5 Furthermore, boards are also governed by the legally imposed 
'ad nutum'  principle, i.e.  directors can be replaced by a simple majority vote of share-
holders at any time. Deviating contractual or charter arrangements would be void (e.g. 
Belgium), or at least difficult to uphold in court (e.g. France).6 In addition, large indem-
nity payments for early dismissal are not allowed either, as these would be considered an 
infringement on this principle. Clearly, for the precommitment problem of section 1.1., 
the at nutum rule excludes a simple cross-directorship as a viable solution to the renego-
tiation problem introduced above. Hence it should not come as  a surprise that the main 
purpose of some of the constructions discussed in this paper is to circumvent this princi-
ple. The fact that the corporation is a separate legal entity also implies that most corpo-
rate forms are anonymous. In these forms, decision power is assigned to specific bodies, 
like the board of directors, or the general meeting. Therefore it is not possible to solve the 
precommitment problem by specifying in the corporate charter that, in case of event E 1 
(E2), the particular individuals MX and M 1 (M2) are to fix the distribution of B 1 (B2)' 
Nevertheless one can give a minority its say in a specific decision by including - next to 
standard super-majority rules imposed by the law7 - special and possibly event-dependent 
super-majorities in the corporate charter (e.g. in case of event E a special super-majority 
is needed). In addition one may also include the requirement that board representation be 
3 In some legal forms,  tailored to the needs of small companies, not all  of these three elements need to be 
present. 
4 French companies may also opt for the 'directoire', i.e. a corporate form with a two tier board. 
S  This contrasts  sharply  with  the  Anglo-Saxon  world  where  boards  usually  are composed  of insiders 
(members of management) and outside directors, and where neither type of directors necessarily represents 
large shareholders. 
6  See e.g.  ByUebier (1993), Maeijer and  Geens  (1990),  Campbell  and  Powers eds.  (1993), Wymeersch 
(1994) in Baums and all). The only real exceptions to the ad  nutum replacement principle occur in Ger-
many and in the 'structure' corporate form of the Netherlands. In the 'directoire' in France the 'directoire'-
tier of the board enjoys some protection against ad nutum dismissal (i.e. unless the director makes an error, 
dismissal entails the payment of an indemnity). 
7 The law typically imposes a super-majority for changes in the corporate charter (usually 75%); these le-
gally imposed  super-majorities are minimal requirements in the sense that firms may choose to make them 
more stringent (i.e. require, say, 90% instead of 75% for a charter change). 7 
proportional to  ownership.  Putting special arrangements into the corporate charter has 
one major disadvantage though.  As  the contents of the charter and any subsequent ad-
justment has to be made public, special arrangements cannot be kept secret. Furthermore, 
also because of the anonymous character of the corporation, one cannot rule out the pos-
sibility of shareholders selling their stakes. 
To solve - or at least alleviate - secrecy problems and difficulties caused by owners' in-
ability to credibly precommit not to sell their shares, shareholder syndicate contracts are 
used. These contracts are private agreements between shareholders that may contain pre-
purchase clauses,  stand still  agreements, voting agreements  (including possibly event-
dependent special super-majority rules and agreements about the allocation of director 
seats) and indemnity clauses in case of breach of contract. The contents of these contracts 
does not have to be made public, and in some countries (e.g. Belgium), even their very 
existence may escape disclosure. However, at least for publicly quoted companies, the 
fact that such a contract has been concluded can be inferred from the disclosures required 
by the European transparency rules: whenever the fraction of shares owned by a party, or 
group of parties tied together by a syndicate contract, changes by more than a certain per-
centage, the transaction has to be made pUblic.89 However, syndicate contracts have one 
major disadvantage: this type of bond between participants is weaker than a bond real-
ized through a corporate charter. That is, if it is prepared to pay an indemnity, a party can 
end the life of a contract by simply walking away from it (exaggerated indemnity pay-
ments  would not be upheld  by the  courts).  Conversely,  because of its  separate  legal 
identity, the life of a corporation does  not end if one of its  shareholders walks away. 
However, notwithstanding the blow-up risk, voting agreements (including special super-
majorities and the rules about the distribution of director seats) are typically laid down in 
these contracts rather than in the corporate charter, because of confidentiality reasons. 
Prepurchase clauses and stand still agreements are also part of these contracts because it 
would be hard to introduce them in the charter in a legally acceptable way. 
One other feature in the European legal system that enhances the usefulness of holding 
constructions in solving the renegotiation problem of section 1.1. is the priority right at-
tached to shares. This right assures that owners with a blocking minority can not be di-
8 EC official publication journal, L 348, December 17, 88. 
9 Syndicate arrangements can take many different forms.  The well documented agreement from mid Sep-
tember  1995  between  the  three  controlling  owners  (i.e.  Groupe  Bruxelles-Lambert,  Gemeentekrediet, 
Royale BeIge) of Banque Brussel Lambert, the second largest commercial bank in Belgium, is  a nice ex-
ample of an event-dependent contract. Amid speculation about a possible sale of the bank, the agreement 
specified that the three owners set up a strategic committee to decide about the bank's future. The commit-
tee was to consist of seven members - representatives of the three owners - and decisions had to be anony-
mous  (i.e.  within  the  strategic committee it specified unanimity consent w.r.t.  the 'event'  strategic deci-
sions). See Financieel Economische Tijd, 16/9195 and 611196. 8 
luted against their wishes when new shares are issued. Finally the last (but not the least) 
consideration is  the out of pocket costs of a solution. The use of a holding firm entails 
one time administrative expenses of incorporation (i.e. registration of the company), the 
cost of running a corporation (i.e. mainly maintaining the accounting system) and taxes. 
According to  practitioners all  of these costs can be kept to  a minimum. In most cases 
costs of incorporation would be below 2% of the nominal value of share capital and, in 
principle, the administrative costs of running the firm could be kept to the equivalent of 
few thousand dollars a year. More importantly however, typically 85  to 95% of all divi-
dends and sometimes also the capital gains holding firms realize, escape corporate taxes. 
Obviously, the out of pocket cost for concluding a syndicate contract is small. 
In the analysis below, this paper presumes that, in accordance with observed practice, at 
time 0, large shareholders agree to allocate board seats among themselves proportional to 
ownership.  In the constructions discussed below this  implies that the  decisions  of the 
board of directors correspond to the choices of the general meeting if the latter would be 
called upon to decide on a particular issue.lO Therefore, the analysis does not distinguish 
between the decisions of the board and the  decisions of the  general meeting.  Further-
more, for expositionary purposes the discussion and consequences of the blow-up risk in 
syndicate contracts is postponed until section 4.  Therefore, it is assumed until section 4 
that proportional board seat allocation as  well as  non-standard super-majorities, are in-
cluded in the corporate charter. Also for expositionary purposes, syndicate contracts are 
assumed to be used only when explicitly mentioned. 
1.3. Holding firms as committees with veto power: an example 
Suppose that initially no one faces binding capital constraints. Also assume that all par-
ties agree to develop a precommitment tool by creating two parallel holding firms HI and 
H2.  MX endows these holding firms with some of its X-shares. Simultaneously, it sells 
blocks of X-shares to M 1 and M2, with a clause that these shares shouid be transferred 
into the holding firms. For concreteness, suppose that MX sells M 1 and M2 each a block 
of 15% in X.  At the same time it endows holding firms HI and H2 respectively with an 
additional 20% and 25% of all X-shares (this to illustrate that symmetry is not a require-
ment for the  solution).  Hence as  depicted in figure  1 below,  after the transaction,  HI 
10  In some countries (e.g. France, Belgium) the directors representing a particular block holder have to 
leave the board meeting when an issue that is of particular interest to this block holder is voted.  However 
as this regulation does not encompass the general meeting (i.e. the body ultimately approving all decisions), 
one may not expect it to  have much impact whenever the large block holder has enough voting power at 
this meeting (in the ownership constructions discussed below this will always be the case). 9 
owns 35% of company X, while MX owns (20/(20+ 15))* 100 = 57% of HI. Similarly H2 
owns 40% of company X and MX holds 62.5% of H2. 
20% of X 
MX 
57% of HI 
15% of X 
HI: 
20%+15% 
25% of X 
MX 
62.5% ofH2 
15% of X  25% of X 
MX 
~%clX  ~%clX  ~%clX 
------.1.--------/------.1 -------- .  Company X  . 
Figure 1 
The top row denotes the percentage of X's equity that MX. M 1 and M2 have put into a 
particular channel of ownership. The percentages shown below MX, M 1, M2, HI and H2 
denote the fraction of ownership in the firm next down the chain. The sums in the rec-
tangles surrounding HI and H2 indicate how the holding firm's ownership in company X 
is distributed. To complete the construction, MX and Ml include in HI's charter an ap-
propriate super-majority (e.g. 75%) conditional on event El (that is, as long as event El 
is not active, HI is governed by simple majority). A similar arrangement is made in H2 
but then conditional  on E2.  Finally,  MX  introduces  an  appropriate  super-majority in 
company X (e.g. 70%). This super-majority may be general or dependent upon events El 
and E2.11  Clearly, for  any decision other than those concerning El and E2, shareholder 
MX can push through its decisions in company X. For MX controls HI and H2 and, fur-
thermore also owns the remainder of the X shares not tied up in the holding firms. How-
ever,  for  anything  related  to  event Eb MX  needs  the  approval  of MI. In  particular, 
whenever M 1 does not agree with MX's proposition about the distribution of B 1, M 1 can 
block the proposal through the holding firm HI. For MX could maximally get 65%  (= 
25%  + 40%)  yes-votes  for  any  proposition not carrying M 1's  consent.  Obviously this 
does not meet the super-majority requirement in firm X.  Furthermore M2 has no power 
in holding firm H2 as long as event E2 is not active. Thus M2 can not force any decision 
concerning B 1 on MX and MI. Hence, M 1 can block the distribution of B 1 in firm X. 
However it cannot stop MX from consuming BX,  nor,  as  readily shown by a similar 
analysis w.r.t. M2 and E2, can it stop MX and M2 from consuming B2. In short M 1 can 
block proposals about B 1 and only about B 1. Furthermore, the example shows that, when 
II Unless explicitly mentioned otherwise a super-majority is always assumed to be non-event-dependent. 10 
an appropriate ownership structure in firm X is combined with a suitable super-majority, 
the pivotal position a co-operator enjoys in its holding firm,  carries over to company X. 
This carry-over logic underlies  all holding firm and ownership structures discussed in 
this paper. In addition it is also interesting to note that the example's enforcement device 
precommits MX to take the preferences of M 1 (M2) into account in all of firm X's stra-
tegic decisions linked to El (E2). Hence, if the issues related to El (E2) are strategically 
important to MX, the latter may also demand a similar enforcement arrangement in the 
firm of M 1 (M2).  Obviously this can only add to  the  intricacy of observed ownership 
patterns. 
The solution of figure 1 essentially serves the purpose of circumventing the precommit-
ment problems created by the ad nutum principle from section 1.2  .. It is shown in section 
4 below that in such a case, an alternative solution may be more efficient, at least if the 
benefits BI (B2) are not too substantial. This is not likely to be true anymore if the ex-
ample is modified to encompass binding capital constraints. In particular, referring back 
to the above example, assume now that the co-operations require important investment 
outlays, and that MX is confronted with a binding capital constraint. As M 1 and M2 have 
some spare financial resources available, they are prepared to purchase each 30% of the 
shares of X.12 Clearly this operation would land MX in a minority position, so that every 
one could be ripped off if the two other parties decide to collude. This two-sided renego-
tiation problem can be solved by modifying the holding structure as shown in figure 2: 
20% inX  10% in X 
MX 
67% in HI  33% in HI 
Hr 
20%+10% 
30% in X 
20% in X  10% in X  20% in X  20% inX 
67% in H2  33% in H2 
30% in X  20% in X  20% in X 
l~ 
Company X  I 
Figure 2 
12 Alternatively, Mx could create a vertical cascade of publicly quoted holding firms on top of company X 
to deal with its capital constraints. In that case M1 and M2 could stick with their 15% block, as in the initial 
situation. However, ifM1 and M2 have spare capital available the solution proposed in the text is preferable 
because it avoids the discount on  the public floatation of  the holding firm  shares. This benefit could be 
shared between Mx, M1  and M2. 11 
As before, an event specific super-majority is introduced into the charters of the holding 
firms  HI and H2.  However in company X,  the standard majority of 50% is used. It is 
easy to see that notwithstanding its reduced (direct and indirect) ownership position, MX 
still keeps general control. Furthermore, whenever event E 1 (E2) is concerned, M 1 (M  2) 
has a pivotal position in HI (H2). It is also easy to check that, just as  in the problem of 
figure 1, these pivotal positions carry over to firm X. The solution in figure 2 shows one 
more crucial property of the holding construction:  next to  solving M 1 (M2)'S  problem 
w.r.t. the distribution of Bl (B2), it also puts a stop on unwarranted recoalitioning that 
could affect pivotal positions. In particular, although (directly and indirectly) M 1 and M2 
own 60% of the shares, they cannot form a coalition against MX because the holding 
structure separately 'glues' M 1 and M2 to MX; neither can M 1 and MX form a coalition 
against M2, nor can MX and M2 collude to rob M 1.13  Nevertheless some residual rene-
gotiation problems may remain. For example, B 1 (B2)  may depend not only upon the 
project, but also upon the quality of the participants in a particular venture. Hence if M 1 
(M  2)  would sell  out ex  -post,  this  could influence B 1 (B2)  and  hence  the  amount  of 
benefits MX receives at time  1. In view of the unobservability of benefit production to 
outsiders, the buyer is likely to be MX or M2 (M 1), at least if the latter would be capable 
of observing benefit production in a co-operation in which it is not involved in.14  Obvi-
ously, to limit such problems, participants could use protective prepurchase agreements. 
Furthermore, to make a sale by M 1 (M2) to M2 (M 1)  more costly, also stand still ar-
rangements  could  be  concluded.  In fact,  MX  may  wish  to  watch  especially  closely 
agreements between M 1 and M2. In particular, if M 1 (M2) sells part of its stake to M2 
(M 1) and vice versa, so that both are simultaneously pivotal in case of events E1  and E2, 
M 1 and M2 have a credible precommitment to tie the negotiations about the distribution 
of Bland B2. This could result in a different benefit distribution from the one in which 
M 1 and M2 negotiate independently with MX. However such tying need not occur. For 
one thing, general negotiation conditions may be such that tying may not increase M 1  's 
and M2's negotiation power at time  1.  In addition,  stand still and prepurchase clauses 
may make such tying prohibitively costly. Furthermore if M 1 (M2)  cannot observe B2 
(B1), such behavior becomes unlikely. Finally, M1  and M2 may be competitors in the 
area of their co-operation so that they may not wish any interference from the other party. 
Similarly, tying policies do  not necessarily benefit MX.  Because of these reasons,  and 
13  Mx could save on the creation of one holding firm at the expense of a more complicated decision  struc-
ture in firm X. In particular Mx could form a holding firm HI  with MI in which both transfer all of their X-
shares. M2 keeps its direct stake of 30% in firm X. If  firm X is equipped with an event-dependent super-
majority (e.g. 80%) conditional on E2, and governed by simple majority otherwise, the structure also solves 
renegotiation. This asymmetric solution and its generalization to  N co-operations does not yield insights 
different from the symmetric case discussed here and in the following section. 
14 A sale to an outsider would presume that this outsider could obtain information. 12 
because of the fact that they do not destroy the pivotal equilibrium (i.e.  no  party can be 
robbed from its pivotal position against its wishes), one may generally expect the above 
'second order' renegotiation games to have a limited effect on benefit sharing. Neverthe-
less, the discussion above offers a rationale for the use of prepurchase clauses and stand 
still agreements, i.e. they reduce residual renegotiation opportunities. 
The solutions corresponding to  figures  1 and 2 have important properties in common; 
they  also  have  implications  for  empirical  research.  In both  solutions  a  multi-holding 
group is created, where the holding firms  placed on top of firm X serve as  a device to 
structure decision power over the latter company. In particular, although in comparison 
with the initial situation in which MX owns 100% of firm X, major changes in company 
X's ownership structure have occurred, there has been little change in the general control 
over firm X.  Notwithstanding the fact that M 1 and M2 have become (directly or indi-
rectly) important block holders, their exercise of control and monitoring is limited only to 
a specific activity of company X.  General control and monitoring remains with MX' As 
shown in section 3.1. below, the phenomenon of 'limited interest' block holders is even 
further enhanced by capital constraints.  IS This specialization-of-interest-representation in 
holding  structures  contrasts  sharply with the  dominant  view  in  the  finance  literature, 
which presumes that all large block holders participate in general monitoring and control. 
Consequently, because of their 'limited interest', block trading by minority owners like 
M 1 and M2 may not have an important impact on firm X.  The limited scope of block 
trading by holding firms may be even further enhanced by the European take-over legis-
lation. In particular, one would expect that a sale by owners with general control tasks 
involves large blocks if 'specialization-of-interests'  plays  an  important role in holding 
structures. However European take-over legislation requires the buyer to launch a public 
bid if an  important change in control takes place through block trading.  Although the 
trigger conditions may differ from country to country, a common ingredient in the rules is 
that the size of the traded block should be sufficiently important. 16  Consequently, when 
holding structures are involved, block trades that could have an important impact, may 
take the form of a public bid. The findings of  Leleux, Vermaelen and Banerjee (1995) 
are consistent with the above view. In their sample of non-controlling stake purchases in 
French listed companies, these authors find that stakes purchased by holding companies 
generate non-significant price reactions in target firms, compared to significant price re-
actions for other acquirors. Furthermore, managerial turnover in target companies follow-
15 In Belgium and France, practitonners refer to this phenomenon as 'Ie systeme de l'actionnaire de refe-
rence'. It means that one important block holder or a limited subset of block holders exercise general con-
trol. 
16 A change in control sufficient to warrant a take-over bid, may be a matter of appreciation by the supervis-
ing authorities  (e.g. in Belgium), or be triggered automatically by exceeding a certain ownership limit (e.g. 
33.33% in France). 13 
ing the block trade is  lower when the buyer is  a holding firm.  Both results indicate less 
active involvement in management by holding firms-bidders as compared to non-holding 
firm bidders. 
Concerning the structure of holding groups, figures  1 and 2 show inter-group sharing of 
holding firm ownership, and possibly also some inter-group sharing of ownership in firm 
X.  By contrast, no  direct (cross) ownership ties between the holding firms  of the same 
group are present. If  these results could be generalized, the analysis above predicts the 
emergence of simple horizontal holding groups with inter-group ties but little intra-group 
ownership between the groups'  holding firms.  Hence,  as  it is  natural  to  expect that a 
simple structure is  preferred to  a complicated one,  the  current solution is  incomplete. 
What is still lacking is an explanation for the intricate intra-group ownership structure of 
large holding groups. Furthermore also the dynamic renegotiation aspects need investi-
gation (i.e. participants may attempt to change the holding construction itself or its prop-
erties). The next section generalizes the above examples to N co-operations with possibly 
many parties per co-operation and analyzes the problem of structural changes. Compli-
cated intra-group ownership is discussed in section 3. 
2. THE CASE OF N PARALLEL HOLDING FIRMS 
2.1. The structure with Nco-operations 
Appendix B considers the conditions under which the renegotiation problem could be 
solved through a parallel holding group structure with N ~  2 co-operation opportunities 
and possibly many outside parties Mj  (Mj  :f:: MX)  per co-operation. It turns  out that a 
parallel holding group solution exists whenever MX is not facing too severe capital con-
straints. Proposition 1 below concerns N co-operations with disjoints sets of n symmetri-
cally treated Mj  per co-operation. It shows the minimal direct and indirect ownership in 
firm X that MX has to maintain for a parallel holding solution to exist. Simultaneously it 
also indicates the corresponding ownership positions of outsiders and the required super-
majorities. 
Proposition 1:  The minimal total indirect ownership proportion in company X that MX 
needs to maintain to form N holding firms with n outside parties in every holding firm is 
equal to [(N - 1)/(2*N)].17 Furthermore MX does not keep any direct ownership in firm X 
17  i.e.  in percentage terms ((N-l)/2N)*lOO. The fact that, next to the required (super) majority, one more 
vote is necessary to push through a decision, is for simplicity not taken into account in the results reported 
in the proposition. The proof in the appendix encompasses marginal additional vote requirements. 14 
while the direct ownership of any Mj amounts to [1I(N2*n)]. This solution requires a su-
per-majority of [(N - 1)/N] in company X. It also requires that MX keeps 1/2 of the own-
ership of every holding firm, with the remainder distributed evenly over the n participat-
ing Mj- Finally, event-dependent super-majorities within every holding firm  may vary 
between (l - 1I2*n) and unanimity. 
Proof: see appendix B 
Proposition 1 shows that the parallel holding solution has a number of drawbacks. First, 
it is easy to see that MX's minimal indirect shareholding (N-l)/(2*N) is increasing in N. 
This implies that with parallel holding firms, more co-operations put additional financial 
pressure on a capital-constrained MX. Hence, whenever MX cannot maintain the mini-
mal ownership required by a parallel holding solution, a different type of structure be-
comes  a  necessity.  Second,  if MX wishes  to  avoid  special  arrangements  in  firm  X, 
maximally two holding firms placed in parallel may share direct control over company x. 
In particular,  proposition  1 implies that the  only co-operation problem that  could be 
solved through parallel holding  firm~ with a simple majority in firm X is one with two 
co-operations, i.e.  (N - 1)/N = (2 - 1)/2 =  0.5.  Finally note for further reference that in 
proposition 1,  a capital-constrained MX does not keep direct ownership in firm X.  The 
reason is that for every additional share of firm X that MX places in a holding firm that it 
marginally controls, an outsider can add one share also without endangering MX's posi-
tion. However in the solution of proposition 1 all of the X-shares owned by this holding 
firm help MX in maintaining general control over firm X. 
2.2. The problem of structural change ex-post 
The issue of structural change ex-post contains two interesting aspects:  the problem of 
MX adjusting the structure ex-post to rob the Mj  from their pivotal positions, and the 
problem of integrating new co-operation opportunities. The importance of the former is-
sue is obvious: if such opportunities were available, the above proposed precomrnitment 
device would disintegrate. The second aspect also has importance in a changing world. 
What is  at stake is whether or not in a holding structure that protects outsiders against 
'bad' changes, there is still room for the integration of new opportunities, i.e.  'good' ad-
justments. Clearly if MX would always have to ask the consent of the outside parties, the 
latter could demand side-payments. Especially if many outsiders are represented in the 
holding structure,  this  type  of renegotiation  opportunities  could become an  important 
problem. 15 
Concerning the problem of 'bad' changes, the Mj understand that, without appropriate 
protection, in the above parallel holding solution, M X  retains the opportunity to undo 
pivotal positions, by changing the holding group structure or the super-majority rules ex-
post. The list of  'bad' games against which rational Mj demand protection is the follow-
mg one: 
- Game A:  liquidation of some Hi. After setting up of the structure, MX may suddenly 
decide to dissolve a holding firm to rob the other participants of the co-operation from 
their pivotal status. To rule this out, holding firm Hi should be endowed with an addi-
tional super-majority that turns all the participating Mj into pivotal players for the liqui-
dation decision. Alternatively, and more straightforward, the holding firms' event defini-
tions could be extended to include liquidation. 
- Game B: sale of shares by some Hi. MX, being the majority owner of Hi, could destroy 
the pivotal positions of its co-owners by selling Hi's ownership in firm X to a new hold-
ing firm Hi§ placed in parallel to Hi. Hence the Mj would rationally demand veto power 
over any sale of firm X's shares by Hi that could destroy Hi's pivotal position. Again, 
this could be solved by extending the event definitions. Alternatively, direct ownership 
positions of the Mj in firm X could be used as the basis for prepurchase clauses in a syn-
dicate agreement between the owners of company X. 
- Game C:  a change in the super-majority rules of holding firm Hi or firm X. Obviously 
rational Mj demand veto power over a change in the super-majority rules governing their 
holding firm and firm X.  On the level of the holding firms,  this problem could be re-
solved by an extension of the event definitions. On the level of company X, some direct 
ownership in firm X  by the Mj. combined with an appropriate super-majority in X's 
charter, would do the trick. 
When negotiating about the structure of the holding group at time 0, a rational MX would 
take into account the ease with which it could ex-post incorporate new opportunities, at 
least if there  was  a  possibility for such an occurrence.  In particular,  a  holding group 
would be lacking structural flexibility when MX would need the consent of (at least some 
of) the Mj  for integrating additional co-operations. Hence the question:  does a parallel 
holding structure offer flexibility if it is equipped with minimal protection clauses that 
are just sufficient to rule out the above games ? Returning for simplicity to the case of 
figure  1,  it is straightforward to  see that its direct ownership in firm X,  allows MX to 
form a new 'committee' by the familiar procedure of selling some of this 25%-block to a 
new co-operator M3, and creating a new parallel holding firm H3. Moreover if in the ini-
tial structure MX would have supplemented firm X with a super-majority that also makes 
its block of 25% pivotal (e.g. 80%), no adjustments requiring the consent of M 1 and M2 
would be necessary. More generally, MX could initially create N parallel empty commit-16 
tees  (i.e.  holding  companies  fully  owned by  MX)  that  are  all  pivotal in the  decision 
making of firm X.  To realize this, MX does not actually need to set up N holding com-
panies.  Obviously keeping  directly  the  X-shares  that  would  be  transferred  into  these 
firms suffices. However according to proposition 1, a policy of keeping direct ownership 
is  not efficient for MX in terms of capital uses.  Furthermore, as  proposition 1 also im-
plies that more co-operations consume more of MX's financial resources, it follows that 
in a world with capital constraints, parallel placements have most chances of occurrence 
in  situations  with few  co-operations  among  an  unchanging  set  of partners,  and  if,  as 
noted in section  1.3., the benefits of the co-operation are  substantial (i.e.  as  indicated 
there, otherwise alternative solutions may be more efficient). In the latter case it is also 
natural to expect that MX demands to be pivotal in the firm of the co-operator as  well 
(see also section 1.3.). Well known examples of companies that use two parallel holding 
firms as a tool of mutual enforcement in a long standing and substantial co-operation, are 
the large Dutch-British groups Shell (a combination of the Royal Dutch Oil company and 
the Transport and Trading Company) and Unilever (a combination of Dutch Unilever and 
British Unilever).18 Also in private firms with second or third generation family owner-
ship, control is sometimes organized through parallel holding firms. 
3. HOLDING SYSTEMS AND TWO-SIDED CAPITAL CONSTRAINTS 
This  section  shows  that  two-sided  capital  constraints  enhance  inter-group  ownership 
links. Furthermore, these constraints are also likely to cause intricate intra-group owner-
ship patterns. In particular, the first subsection offers a rationale for the varying size in 
the blocks that different outsiders may own in the same holding company. The second 
subsection discusses cascading of holding firms that are used for enforcement. 
3.1. The market for soft information and non-pivotal shares 
Reconsider the problem of figure 2 but now suppose that next to MX also M 1 and M2 
face capital constraints. Neither MInor M2 can afford to sell any of their direct owner-
ship in company X, as such a sale would result in a loss of their pivotal position. Clearly, 
this capital constraint problem could be solved by the creation of non-pivotal ownership 
blocks that could be sold without upsetting the equilibrium. Without changing the struc-
ture proposed in figure 2, some of the equity can be made non-pivotal by an appropriate 
definition of the super-majorities. For example, suppose that in holding firm HI the event 
specific super-majority would have been set at 83.5%. Then M 1 could reduce its owner-
18 The issue of organizing long term co-operations either by parallel placement of holding firms, or by out-
right merger, or by a new still to be created specially tailored European legal form, is a matter of ongoing 
debate in the law literature (e.g. see Honee (1991), Byttebier (1994)). 17 
ship in holding firm HI from 33% to [100% - 83.5%] =  16.5% without endangering its 
super-majority protection.l9 Similarly, also in H2 some of the shares could be made non-
pivotal. This of course presumes there are buyers for these ownership blocks. In practice, 
these blocks could be sold for the soft information exchanged at board meetings. Fur-
thermore the personal contacts at these meetings could result in mutual beneficial oppor-
tunities. These objectives could be realized by providing outsiders-smaller-block-holders 
with non-pivotal director seats (for the impact of soft information and owner representa-
tion on firm policy, see e.g. Francis and Smith (1995)).20 Moreover, the discussion in the 
above sections implies that each holding firm Hi has its specialization centered around its 
own co-operation activity.  Consequently each holding firm may have its own specific 
soft information to sell. 
Proposition 2:  Reconsider the solution of proposition  1.  Within any holding firm that 
governs company X, the maximal proportion of non-pivotal holding firm shares is equal 
to  l/[2*(n+1)]. It is obtained when MX's ownership proportion amounts to 0.5 and the 
event-dependent super-majority is equated to [1  - 0.5/(n+  1)]. On the level of the owner-
ship of company X there are no non-pivotal shares?l 
Proof: see appendix C 
One surprising consequence of proposition 2  is  that large variation in the size of the 
ownership blocks of a holding firm may be compatible with a symmetrical solution to the 
renegotiation  problem in co-operations:  the  large  blocks  represent  owners  with veto 
power and the smaller ones may represent purchasers of soft information. The proposi-
tion implies that the proportion of non-pivotal shares per holding firm dwindles quickly 
as the number of participants per co-operation (i.e. MX and n Mj) increases.22  Since the 
buyers of these smaller stakes may be under capital constraints themselves, what may be 
needed is a holding group structure that allows for raising large amounts of non-pivotal 
capital in the stock exchange. 
19  To be fully accurate, MI could reduce its ownership in holding firm HI to (16.5% + 1 share). 
20 In a model that would aim at deriving explicitely an optimal holding group structure, the sale of soft in-
formation  could  be included  by  assuming  that  such  a  sale increases  the  probability of future  new  co-
operation opportunities with a certain factor. 
21  Just as in proposition 1, the fact that, next to the required (super) majority, one more vote is necessary to 
push through a decision, is for simplicity not taken into account in the results reported in the proposition. 
The proof in the appendix encompasses marginal additional vote requirements. 
22 The proportion of non-pivotal shares summed over all N holding firms (i.e. N/2*(n+  1»  increases in N. 18 
3.2. Capital constraints as generators of intra-group ownership 
Sufficiently strong capital constraints on MX necessarily lead to  direct ownership ties 
between the holding firms of the same group. In particular, proposition 1 implies that if 
MX is  not capable of maintaining a majority position in all  holding firms  Hi,  parallel 
placement of these  companies  is  an  infeasible  solution  to  the  renegotiation  problem. 
Furthermore, if scarcity of capital is  also an  issue for the co-operators, in a major way 
additional shareholders (i.e. the public) may be needed to support the financing of firm 
X.  In view of the supplementary discount on holding firm shares, the least cost solution 
would be the one where the equity of company X is publicly floated. 23  In that case the 
simplest construction that maintains  the  pivotal equilibrium,  places  the  'enforcement' 
holding firms in cascade. In particular, suppose that in the problem in which MX organ-
izes a co-operation with M 1 and M2, the three parties opt for cascading holding firms 
H 1  and H2.  For concreteness, suppose that MX sells M 1 and M2 each a block of 17%, 
under the condition of subsequent transfer into the holding firms. Then MX places 18% 
of the X-shares in H 1 and M 1 adds its block of 17%. In turn H 1 transfers this ownership 
into H2. Next also M2 transfers its block of 17% into H2. Finally, the remainder of firm 
X's shares is sold to the public. This structure is graphically represented in figure 3 be-
low: 
18% in X  17% in X 
MX  M1 
51 % in HI  49% in HI 




17% in X 





-...........  +- I
r------"----I 
.  Company X 
Figure 3 
48% in X 
public 
48% in X 
23  Only if this operation would not enable these three parties to design the sought for decision power struc-
ture, public floatation of holding firm shares would take place. 19 
To complete the solution, holding firms HI and H2 are subjected to an event-dependent 
super-majority, conditional on El respectively E2, while firm X remains governed by a 
standard simple majority. Just as in the case of parallel holding firms, M 1 (M2) can block 
any decision of firm X in the area of its co-operation. In particular, if E1  occurs and M 1 
does not agree with MX's proposal, it can block HI. Since HI has a majority in H2, that 
in turn has a majority in firm X, the latter company is blocked also. A similar argument 
holds true for M2. The present solution shares with the previous parallel placement con-
structions, the specialization-in-interest property and the occurrence of inter-group own-
ership. However there are also some significant differences. In particular, figure 3 illus-
trates that cascading readily turns large fractions of equity into non-pivotal stock. That is, 
the votes of the 48% X-shares placed in public cannot disturb the enforcement equili-
bruim between MX, M 1 and M2.24 Furthermore, contrary to  the case of parallel place-
ment, with cascading more co-operations relieve a capital-constrained MX' In addition, 
the present structure has the advantage that no  special super-majorities are required in 
firm X.25 Hence, as this solution is both simple and cost efficient, the question arises why 
capital-constrained holding groups often do  not show a pure vertical intra-group struc-
ture. In view of the discussion in section 2.2., the first explanation that comes to mind is 
structural inflexibility caused by protection clauses for minority owners. For not only do 
co-operators need protection for the bad structural games listed in section 2.2., in the case 
of cascading they also need protection for an extension of games A and B: 
- Game A§:  liquidation of some holding firm  lower in the chain.  In particular, in the 
problem of figure 3, MX and M2 could agree to rob M 1 from its share in the benefits B1 
by dissolving holding firm H2, and replacing it by another holding firm H2p placed in 
~ 
parallel to  HI. Suppose this occurs after MX has found a way to circumvent its capital 
constraints (e.g. costly public floatation of a newly created holding firm, sale of assets, ... ) 
so that MX can launch a take-over bid on the 48% of company X's shares. Holding firm 
H2~ then receives all shares bought from the public and the 17% shares of M2 (in return 
s 
for its co-operation M2 receives the protection of a super-majority clause for event E2 in 
holding firm H2§ plus possibly some other advantages). Clearly, with its majority of 65% 
(= 48% + 17%),  H2~ has  destroyed HI's pivotal position.  Such a procedure could be 
~ 
quite costly for MX:  next to  suffering the discount on the public sale of holding firm 
shares, MX may also have to  pay a take-over premium.  Still M1  may wish to be pro-
tected against it. Obviously M 1  's problem is solved if it obtains veto power over the liq-
uidation decision of H2. This could be realized by providing M 1 with some shares in H2 
and by inserting an appropriate super-majority W.r.t.  liquidation in H2's charter. Loss of 
24  Contrary to the Anglo-Saxon tradition, in Continental Europe a parent company does not have to main-
tain an arm's length relationship with a publicly quoted daughter. 
25  The ownership conditions for a cascade system with N co-operations and pivotal properties is given in 
appendix C. 20 
pivotal  position  through  holding  firm  dissolution  cannot  hit  M2.  Whatever  happens 
higher up the chain, holding firm H2 in figure 3 continues to have majority control over 
company X,  and no matter who is the majority owner of the shares of holding firm H2, 
the  super-majority in H2 requires Mis consent in case of event E2.  Clearly in the N 
holding firm case, the enforcement solution requires that every Mj  has veto power over 
the liquidation of holding firms lower in the chain.26 
- Game B§:  sale of shares by some holding firm lower in the chain. If in the problem of 
figure 3, MX and M2 could agree to transfer H2's shares in firm X into a new holding 
firm H2~, M 1 would be robbed from its pivotal position. To stop this it is sufficient that 
~ 
M1  obtains veto power over pivotal block transfers in H2'S ownership of firm X.  More 
generally, in the N holding firm case, the enforcement solution requires that every Mj has 
veto power over trade of pivotal blocks of shares owned by holding firms  lower in the 
chain. 
However the above games need not cause structural inflexibility. In particular, in a hold-
ing group with protections that rule out all of the above games, MX could still transfer its 
ownership in H 1 into a new holding firm H3  (placed on top of H 1) and sell some of the 
ownership to  a new co-operator M3.  As this transaction does  not endanger the pivotal 
positions of M 1 and M2, it is feasible in a fully protected structure. To assure that it can 
provide the new co-operator with protection against the bad games described just above 
without having to depend upon the agreement of M 1 and M2, MX could have arranged 
that it may transfer non-pivotal proportions of the assets of the holding firms  (i.e.  such 
transfers do  not allow MX to play bad games).  Alternatively, in the initial set up, MX 
may already create 'empty' and fully protected committees in the chain. All this implies 
that structural inflexibility reasons do not necessarily explain deviations from a pure cas-
cade structure. 
Nevertheless capital constraints and use of cascaded holding firms  as  enforcement de-
vices,  create  conditions  under which deviations  from  the simple structure  of a  single 
(long) holding firm line are likely to arise in practice: 
A. Difficulties for the co-operators Mj  to get their preferences implemented in firm(s) X. 
One may expect that in practice, at each node some of the information contained in the 
messages from the holding firms higher up in the chain is lost or distorted, especially as 
26  As  an  alternative solution, MX could extend the event definitions  to  include liquidation decisions in 
every holding firm down the chain. Finally, a third way to ease H (s renegotiation worries is  a syndicate 
agreement containing prepurchase clauses and stand still agreements among the owners of holding firm H2 
(the latter clause is needed to stop MX and M2 from playing the take-over trick). However, again M 1 must 
be made a party to this contract; otherwise, just as for the dissolution decision of holding firm H2, MX and 
M2 may simply agree to discontinue the contract (see also the discussion in section 4 below). All this im-
plies that in a structure with cascading, smaller block holders may represent purchasers of soft information 
as well as owners with a pivotal position W.r.t. liquidation. 21 
these messages have to reflect the preferences of an increasing number of parties as  one 
moves down the chain.27  This problem is  likely to  become especially important if the 
holding group controls several non-holding firms. Hence it is natural to expect that oth-
erwise  too  lengthy  control  lines  are  shortened by combining  cascading  with  parallel 
placement. 
B.  Deviations caused by loss  of soft information. Next to the Mj  also MX may be af-
fected by the loss of information in the chain. This may be particularly problematic as 
MX exercises general control. Consequently, to receive the soft information exchanged at 
firm X's board meetings or at the board meetings of some holding firms down the chain, 
MX may take a direct participation in those firms (section 3.1. implies that MX can do 
this ex-post without upsetting the enforcement eqUilibrium as long as its direct ownership 
block is non-pivotal). To ascertain an exact implementation of its preferences, MX may 
even find it important to be directly present in some firms down the chain with a pivotal 
position. Consequently, if the pivotal positions of the other participants are to be main-
tained, generally some deviation of pure cascade in the initial set up will be required. 
C.  Deviations  caused by stringent capital constraints.  A  very efficient way  in  which, 
through time MX can save capital in a set up like figure 3,  is have the bottom holding 
firm H2 accumulate the dividends from firm X to repurchase some of MX's  shares in 
holding firm H 1.  It is easy to check that the resulting cross ownership does  not affect 
pivotal positions, and hence does not disturb the renegotiation-free equilibrium ex-post.28 
More generally,  MX can use cross  and circular ownership in the initial set up of the 
structure and/or introduce it afterwards to save on capital without upsetting the enforce-
ment mechanism. Furthermore, cross ownership between lines of parallel holding firms 
could also  have positive effects on information streams across  these lines.  However it 
should be mentioned that, although it has not been ruled out entirely, MX's opportunities 
to use vertical cross ownership have been drastically reduced since the introduction of the 
second EC directive (article 24a) that limits such ownership to  maximally  10% of the 
votes of share capital.  29 
27  This can readily be  incorporated explicitely  in the model by  assuming for example that the range of 
events Ei  (and  consequently also  the  portion of Bj  over which the  Mj  have  veto  power)  'shrink'  as  the 
length of the chain below these Mj increases. 
28  Nevertheless it imposes opportunity costs on M 1, M2 (M3) as  the dividends that otherwise could have 
been paid out are now used  to ease MX's capital constraints. The same problem may  also  occur in  the 
structure with parallel holding firms. MX can be stopped if the use of a holding firm's accumulated cash is 
made part of the event definitions (i.e. by dealing with this opportunity cost the solution is being extended 
to encompass the distribution of security benefits). 
29 Ee official publication journal, L 347, November 28, 92. This directive only limits vertical cross owner-
ship. However some countries (e.g. Belgium) have extended this limit to encompass horizontal cross own-
ership also. 22 
4. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
To explain the holding structure as a rational response to renegotiation problems, it does 
not only have to be an effective and cost efficient solution, but it also has to be the best of 
all available alternatives. This section shows that other solutions are likely to be either 
unsuitable or ineffective. 
4.1. Shareholder syndicates30 
Although currently Continental European courts uphold syndicate contracts, this has not 
always been the case (e.g.  in France, see Byttebier (1993), Maeijer and Geens (1990)). 
Moreover, in the  past,  these agreements,  or certain components, were sometimes also 
limited in time. For instance, in Belgium, until  1993, syndicate contracts could be con-
cluded for  an  indefinitely long time period, but their voting agreements  had to  be re-
newed every 5 years.  Generally, over the last several years,  Continental European law 
and court decisions have been changing in favor of syndicate agreements. If this trend 
continues and also encompasses court support for high penalties on breach of contract, 
these agreements may more easily replace holding firms.  For example, imagine that in 
the problem of figure 2, as before, M 1 and M2 would each buy 30% of firm X's shares. 
However, the three parties would conclude a syndicate contract instead of creating the 
holding firms  H 1 and H2.  Suppose this  contract  would  encompass  the  following  ar-
rangement: 
Decisions may be taken by mutual consent of MX, M 1 and M2. 
Disagreement triggers the following procedure: 
A. Disagreement does not concern events E1 or E2. Then a decision requires majority 
support where MX, M 1 and M2 receive respectively 60%, 20% and 20% of the votes. 
B.  Disagreement concerns event E1. Then a decision requires a super-majority of 
80% while MX, M 1 and M2 receive respectively 50%, 40% and 10% of the votes. 
C.  Disagreement concerns event E2. Then a decision requires a super-majority of 
80% while MX, M 1 and M2 receive respectively 50%, 10% and 40% of the votes. 
Clearly the above agreement perfectly mimics the pivotal positions of MX, M 1 and M2 
in the holding solution of figure 2. Unfortunately, since any change in a contract typically 
requires  the  consent of all  parties involved,  the  syndicate  agreement only  mimics  in-
flexible holding structures. Hence, if flexibility is important, syndicate contracts without 
30 Until now  syndicate contracts were discussed from the perspective of how these contracts support the 
holding solution.  In this  section it is  shown that under certain circumstances the voting agreements of a 
syndicate contract can be used as a substitute for a holding construction. 23 
blow-up risk could still not replace the structure of a holding group. Nevertheless if the 
trend of contract strengthening continues, one may expect to see holding groups 'simplify' 
as some holding firms are replaced by a syndicate agreement. 
Another issue that needs clarification, is the reason why in practice, one creates holding 
firms and simultaneously places all the rules governing voting (i.e. distribution of direc-
tor seats, special super-majority arrangements) in syndicate contracts. As a chain is only 
as strong as its weakest component, one may wonder why one does not simply opt for the 
syndicate  contract  solution  discussed just above.  However,  this  policy of combining 
holding structures with syndicate agreements becomes quite understandable if one notes 
that, by placing holding firms in between the syndicate contract and company X, the in-
centives for walking away from the agreement may be reduced. In particular, reconsider 
the problem of figure 2,  and suppose for a moment that the holding firms HI and H2 
would be replaced by a syndicate contract between MX, M 1 and M2. In that case MX 
would directly own 40% of company X while M 1 and M2 would each own 30%. If  this 
arrangement would mimic the holding structure of figure 2, it would assign MX all of the 
control benefits BX of company X (i.e. other than Bland B2) plus a share of Bland B2. 
Clearly, M 1 and M2 would have a strong incentive to collude against MX and walk away 
from the contract.  In particular, by blowing up  the contract,  a  colluding M 1 and M2 
would share majority ownership over firm X, while MX would be left in an unprotected 
minority position. Clearly in that situation, Ml and M2 could pocket Bl and B2 and on 
top BX. If, as assumed in section 1.1., BX is much more important than Bland B2, only 
a large indemnity could stop a rational M 1 and M2.  However when, as  in figure 2,  the 
three parties opt for the solution with holding firms  and non-standard arrangements in-
cluded in syndicate agreements, MX would gain by walking away from these contracts.3l 
For this action reduces M 1  's and Mis ownership to a weak minority position. However 
this move would yield MX only limited additional profits: all MX could gain by blowing 
up the syndicate agreements in both holding firms HI and H2 is M I's and Mis share in 
Bland B2. Clearly  the syndicate contracts on top of the holding firms HI and H 2 are 
much easier to maintain than the syndicate agreement without the holding firms.32  Re-
peating the analysis for the problem of figure  1,  it is  easy to see that there the holding 
31  Note that if the pivotal equilibrium solution with the holding firms requires a special super-majority in 
company X, also a syndicate contract is  needed among the owners of company X.  Here again the renego-
tiation problem due to dissolution of the syndicate contract binding the owners of company X  may lurk 
around the corner, unless the parties in the top holding firms are made part of the agreement. If  Mx wishes 
to avoid this, it may design a structure in which the pivotal equilibrium may be sustained without any super-
majority in X.  As remarked earlier, proposition 1 implies that a parallel holding solution can be sustained 
by simple majority in company X if maximally 2 holding firms share direct control of firm X. 
32 Furthermore, the fact that holding structures in combination with syndicate agreements offer MX benet  i-
cal blow-up possibilities, is  likely to function as an additional stick behind the door if M 1 and M2 would 
contemplate playing the residual tying game discussed in section 1.3. above. 24 
firms  HI and H2 do  not affect the walk away incentives (i.e.  in either case MX may 
maximally gain M 1  's and Mis share of Bland B2). Clearly in the latter situation, there 
is less of a reason to create HI and H2, except possibly when the benefits Bland B2 are 
so  substantial  that  the  strength  of charter  arrangements  is  necessary.33  34  The above 
analysis also implies that another situation in which it may not be useful to create holding 
firms is the case where BX is evenly distributed over owners. This could occur when BX 
mainly consists of the gains from a possible future take-over of firm X (i.e. according to 
European take-over law, a bidder has to pay all shareholders the same price)?5 Finally, 
ownership that is solely aimed at creating veto power over holding firm dissolution or 
changes in super-majorities (i.e. to stop bad games ex-post), is also an obvious candidate 
for replacement by appropriate arrangements in syndicate contracts. 
4.2. Other alternatives 
Likewise syndicate agreements, other co-operative forms may not always be as  efficient 
as the holding structure in solving this paper's renegotiation problem. This will prove to 
be the case for the following well known co-operative forms. 
A. Cross-directorship. See the discussion in section 1.2. 
B. Direct ownership. As explained in the above section, direct ownership supplemented 
with syndicate agreements may be vulnerable to contract disintegration, especially when 
MX is not capable of maintaining majority control over company X without the help of 
holding constructions.  However when MX keeps  a majority stake in firm X, or if the 
control benefits of this firm are limited, direct ownership is likely to be the preferred so-
lution. 
C.  Joint venture. It is not always obvious to define the assets that should go into a joint 
venture. It may also be strategically unsound to shift particular assets  into such an  ar-
rangement. For example, the co-operation may involve assets that are  of prime impor-
tance to MX' Hence ifMX puts those into a joint venture with 50/50 % ownership (either 
with M 1 or with M2), MX may lose control over important pieces of company X's busi-
ness. Furthermore the same assets that are used to produce B 1 may also be important in 
33  If B 1 (B2) is large and hence blow-up risk is substantial, a syndicate contract could still be sustainable 
if,  according to  the standard super-majority rules of the law, M 1 (M2)'s ownership constitutes a minority 
that may block charter changes. For this blocking power remains, even if the syndicate agreement disinte-
grates (see also  section  1.2.). Furthermore it  is  interesting to  note that in the earlier indicated examples 
Unilever and  Shell,  where  one  may  expect the  benefits  of the  co-operation  to  be  substantial,  the  co-
operation rules are imbedded in the charters. 
34 The trade off between the use of syndicate contracts and holding firms can be regarded as an example of 
the Coasian trade off between  the use of the market (private contracts) and the use of a firm (the holding 
firm). This  comparison  to the Coasian  trade off was  suggested  to me by G. Elewaut. 
35  In that case Bx would be paid out as a security benefit instead of as a private benefit. Note that the syndi-
cate agreement mentioned in section 1.2. above could be an example of such a case. 25 
producing B2, B3,.··· So if one opts for a joint venture, it should involve MX, M b  M2, 
M3, ... , and be governed by a syndicate contract to  sustain the required pivotal equilib-
rium. Furthermore, as  more co-operations are included, the possible gains from walking 
away from the syndicate agreement may increase.  Finally, even if the  contract is  sus-
tained, any subsequent change requires everybody's consent. Hence a maxi joint venture 
with a large number of partners constitutes an inflexible solution. 
D.  Merger. It is well known that many mergers do  not payoff, ex-post, because of the 
costs arising from fully integrating several companies. Clearly, the holding arrangement 
creates  flexible  opportunities  for  partial  co-operation between  (possibly  many)  firms, 
while avoiding the problems of a complete integration. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper offers  a new  rationale for  the existence of European multi-holding groups 
with inter and intra-group ownership. It shows that maintenance of pivotal equilibria and 
capital constraints are likely to be important factors in determining ownership structures. 
The paper also explores the interaction between holding firms and syndicate agreements 
and explains why, in practice, these contracts are often used in conjunction with holding 
arrangements.  Next to  explaining several observed regularities in holding group struc-
tures, the findings of the paper have several implications. In particular, the paper predicts 
that when capital constraints are less of an issue, and co-operation between companies 
(or different parties) is organized through holding firms, relatively simple holding struc-
tures are likely to emerge. Similarly, it predicts that the holding structures of groups with 
few  co-operations with outsiders are likely to be relatively simple also.  Furthermore if 
there are  inter-group connections,  the  findings  imply that holding groups  mainly own 
stakes in holding firms of other groups that control companies in businesses related to the 
businesses the former group controls. Finally, the insights of the paper are also consistent 
with recent empirical evidence on the observed limited impact of block trading by hold-
mg groups. 26 
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Appendix A:  Some examples of holding group structures 
Appendix A contains the following examples: 
- Inter connections between the main French holding groups. 
- A simplified representation of Groupe Bruxelles Lambert (GBL) a Belgian holding 
group. This is followed by a close up of Tractebel, one of GBL' s participations in 
which it shares control with French Suez daughter Societe Generale (Tractebel is 
indicated in GBL's ownership chart on page 5 of this appendix). Finally a closer look 
of Watco, one of the companies under the control of Tractebel is provided also 
(Watco is indicated in Tractebel's ownership chart on page page 10) . 
- A representation of the ownership structure of Swedish Volvo. 1. Inter Connection between the main French holding groups 
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Appendix 2 2. A Belgian group: Groupe Bruxelles Lambert (GBL) 
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Three Wallenberg foundations 
1.  Knut &  Alice Wallenbergs 
foundation 
2.  Marianne & Marcus 
Wallenbergs Foundation 
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Appendix B: N parallel holding firms 
1. The conditions for the case with N co-operations and parallel holding firms 
Consider N  co-operation opportunities i (i  =0 1, ... ,ik, ... N),  each with a distinctive Bi 
and Ei. These opportunities involve in sum n ~  N parties Mj other than MX' Each of 
the Mj  U = I,  ... ,jl, ... n
o
)  may participate in  several co-operations.  A  solution to  the 
renegotiation problem involves the following steps: 
A. Creation of committees. 
A.I. Associate with each co-operation an observable event Ei. 
A.2. Create N parallel holding firms, one for each co-operation. Each holding firm Hi 
is governed by simple majority (+ 1 share), except when its event Ei is active; then a 
super-majority of SHi (+ 1 share) is  required.  MX (Mj)  owns sMX,Hi (SMj,Hi)  in 
holding firm Hi. Futhermore the sum of the ownership in Hi of all Mj (i.e. Mj  :j::. MX ) 
involved  in  co-operation  i  is L j  SMj(i),Hi.  The  ownership  distribution  of  every 
holding firm Hi satisfies the following conditions: 
- MX has majority control: 
sMXHi>O.5  ,  (Bl) 
- when Ei is active and one Mjl (i)  in the co-operation does not agree, the required 
super-majority is not reached: 
sMX,Hi + L j  SMj(i),Hi - SMjl(i),Hi ~  SHi  (B2) 
- when Ei is  active and all parties in the co-operation agree, the required majority is 
reached: 
sMX,Hi + L j  SMj(i),Hi > SHi  (B3) 
It is clear from preceding conditions, that capital constraints may be a problem for 
MX (i.e. (B 1)). By choosing the super-majority appropriately such constraints are not 
a problem for the Mj, at least as long as MX is not capital constrained. In particular if 
MX can take up virtually all of the shares in each Hi and SHi imposes unanimity, the 
Mj only need to hold very few shares. 
B. Structuring the ownership of company X. 
Every parallel holding firm owns sHi,X of the shares of company X.  Similarly MX 
(MJ ') holds a fraction sMX X (SMJ'  X) of firm X's shares. Finally denote by L . sMJ'  X  ,  ,  ]  ' 
the total  sum of direct ownership of all  Mj  (i.e.  Mj  :j::.  MX) and by Sx (+  1)  the 
general super-majority rule in company X.I  Then the ownership distribution (SHi,x, 
1 An event dependent super majority would work also. · Appendix 19 
sMX,X, SMj,X) supplemented with the general super-majority rule Sx in company X, 
gives MX control and provides the holding firms Hi with an event specific veto if: 
- MX has control when no event Ei is active: 
I· sHi X + sMX X > Sx  l,  ,  (B4) 
- when event Eik is active, no required majority can be found unless all Mj involved in 
co-operation ik agree with Mx: 
I  i;<ik sHi,X + sMX,X + I  j SMj,X - I  j SMj(ik),X.:s; Sx  (BS) 
- when all parties involved in co-operation ik agree, the required super-majority Sx is 
reached: 
Ii  sHi,X + sMX,X + I  j SMj(ik),X > Sx 
The following feasibility conditions have to be met also: 
- ownership is non-negative: 
(B6) 
sMX,Hi, SMj,Hi, sHi,X, sMX,X, SMj,X ~  0 for all i,j  (B7) 
- all shares in holding firms Hi and company X are held by someone: 
sMX,Hi + I  j SMj(i),Hi =  1 for all Hi; 
Ii  sHi,X + sMX,X + I  j SMj,X =  1 for company X  (B8) 
To  define  capital  constraints,  a  specification  of  security  values  is  needed,  For 
simplicity the total security value of company X and holding firm Hi is rescaled to 1 
and  hi  (hi  .:s;  1)  respectively,  Hence  if MX  or  the  other  participants  are  capital 
constrained, the following conditions have to be added: 
Ii  hi*sMX Hi + sMX X < KMX  with KMX (0 < KMX.:s; 1)  ,  , 
similarly for any Mj: 
I'  h'*sM' H' + SM' X < KM'  1  1  j,  1  j,  j  with 0 < KMj .:s;  1  (B9) 
and K,  a capital constraint. 
Obviously (B4) is a more stringent condition than (B6),  Hence abstracting from the 
feasibility constraints (B7),  (B8)  and (B9),  (B4)  and (BS)  imply that the problem is 
solved whenever for any co-operation ik, ownership positions can be found such that: 
I  i:;t: ik sHi,X + sMX,X + I  j sMj,X - I  j SMj(ik),X < Ii  sHi,X + sMX,X 
or after simplification: 
I  j SMj,X -Ij  SMj(ik),X < SHik,X  (BlO) 
Condition (B 10) implies that, excluding MX, the direct ownership position in 
company X of all parties not involved in co-operation ik should be below the 
ownership of the holding firm Hik' Hence when there exists a solution for inequality 
(B 10) consistent with some Sx satisfying 0,5 .:s; Sx  .:s;  1, the case with N parallel 
holding firms is solved, Such a solution can certainly be found whenever MX sells 
only a limited fraction of the X shares to the Mj- For example, suppose MX maintains 
sufficient ownership so that, if the holding firms are filled with all ownership of the Appendix 20 
M} MX keeps its majority in every Hi. Then sMj,X =  0 and (B 10) is satisfied. 
Furthermore if a high enough Sx is chosen (e.g. Sx =  1), conditions (B4) and (BS) are 
met. 
2. Proof of proposition 1. 
In the symmetrical case with N co-operations and n (n < nO)  non overlapping Mj  (in 
addition to MX) per co-operation, MX has to solve the following linear problem: 
Minimize  N*(sH X/2 + 1 share) + sMX X  ,  , 
sMX,H; SX; sMX,X 
subject to: 
N*sH X + sMX X > Sx  ,  , 
(N-l)*sH X + sMX X + (N-l)*n*sM X:s; Sx  "  , 
sH X, sMX X, sM X ~  0  ,  ,  , 
N*sH X + sMX X + N*n*sM X = 1 2  ,  ,  , 
where, because of the symmetry, all sMX,Hi =  sMX,H and also all SMj,X =  sM,X' 
Note that in the above objective function, sH X/2 represents a fraction of ownership.  , 
In contrast (+ 1 share) is not a fraction. It represents the small quantity of additional 
votes that avoids the tie that would occur if one party or colluding group of parties, 
would obtain a fraction of the votes exactly equal to  the required majority, whereas 
another party or group of parties would own a fraction exactly equal to (I - required 
majority). 
The solution of the above program can be derived directly. The first two constraints 
imply: 
(N-l)*n*sM X < sH X  (i.e. the symmetrical case version of constraint (BIO)).  ,  , 
MX can continue to add co-operations N until this condition becomes binding or: 
(N-I)*n*sM,X + I share =  sH,X  (B 11) 
Substituting  this  minimal  value  of sH X  in  the  condition  that  all  ownership  of  , 
company X must add up to 1, yields: 
N*sH X + sMX X + N*n*sM X =  ,  ,  , 
= N*(N-l)*n*sM X + N shares + sMX X + N*n*sM X = I  ,  "  (BI2) 
Note that for every share MX adds to  a holding firm,  some other participant M can 
add one more share too without endangering MX's majority in the holding firm.  As 
the majority owner implicitly uses these minority shares in exercising control over X, 
2 As constraint (B6) is less stringent than constraint (B4), the symmetrical version of the former has 
been dropped. Also the capital constraint has been dropped as it is assumed to be non binding. Appendix 21 
it is interesting for a capital constrained MX to put all its ownership into the holding 
firms,  and choose sMX X = O.  Taking this into account, and solving equation (B 12)  , 
for sM X yields:  , 
sM X = [1  - N shares]/(N2*n)  , 
Substituting this value back into (B 11) yields: 
sH X = (N-1)/N2 + lIN shares  , 
When these values for SM X and SH X are substituted into the first two constraints of  ,  , 
the minimization program, these constraints imply: 
Sx = (N - l)/N 
If  one takes into account only integer amounts of shares, the solution becomes: 
sMX= 1I(N2*n) -1 share  (B13)  , 
sH X = (N-l)1N2 + 1 share  (BI4)  , 
Sx = (N - 1)/N + (N-I) shares 
Finally, the proposition's ownership proportions in the holding firms  H  are obvious 
from preceding arguments. The bounds for SH can readily be seen by considering the 
symmetrical case version of conditions (B2) and (B3). 
Appendix C 
1. The ownership conditions for an N-holding cascade system 
The generalization towards a cascade system with N holding firms is  straightforward. 
One only needs to assign to each holding firm a number i according to its place in the 
cascade and replace conditions (B 1) to (B9) by the following ones: 
- MX has  majority control in H I and each holding firm Hi-l has majority control in 
holding firm Hi: 
sMX HI> 0.5  , 
sHi-1 Hi> 0.5  for all i=2, ... N  , 
(CI) 
- when event Ei is  active and one party Mjl(i) does not agree,  super-majority is  not 
reached: 
sMX,Hl + Lj SMj(1),Hl - SMjl(1),HI ~  SHI 
sHi-l,Hi + 2.j  SMj(i),Hi - SMjl(i),Hi ~  SHi  for i=2, ... N  (C2) 
- when event Ei  is  active  and  all  parties  in  co-operation i  agree,  super-majority is 
reached: 
sMX,Hl + L j SMj(1),Hl > SHI 
sHi-I,Hi + L j SMj(i),Hi > SHi for all i=2, ... N  (C3) 
- MX has control in X whenever no event Ei is active: Appendix 22 
sHNX+SMXX>SX  (C4)  ,  , 
- when event Eik is active, Sx can be reached only if the Mj(ik) agree: 
sHN,X + sMX,X + L j SMj,X - L j SMj(ik),X + public.:;; Sx  (CS) 
for every ik = I ... N; 
sHN,x + sMX,X + L  j SMj(ik),X > Sx  (C6) 
- the technical feasibility conditions are obvious, and the capital constraint conditions 
become: 
hI*SMX,Hl + sMX,X < KMX and 
L' h'*sM' H' + sM' X < KM'  1  1  J,  1  J,  J 
2. Proof of proposition 2 
(C9) 
Let us first consider the maximization of the fraction of non pivotal shares in anyone 
of the N holding firms Hi. This maximal portion of non pivotal shares can be obtained 
as a solution to the following program: 
Max  (1- sMX H - n.sM H)  ,  , 
SH, sM,H, sMX,H 
subject to: 
sMX H + n*sMH> SH  ,  , 
sMX,H + (1  - sMX,H - n*sM,H) + (n-I)*sM,H':;; SH 
SH :::::0.5; sM,H :::::0; sMX,H > 0.5 
(CIO) 
(CII) 
where because of the symmetry, sMX,Hi =  sMX,H for all Hi and SMj,Hi =  sM,H for 
all Mj  and Hi. 
The program can be solved directly by noting that the maximal amount of non pivotal 
shares is equal to [sM,H - 1 share] or 1 - sMX,H - n*sM,H =  sM,H - 1 share. Hence 
sM,H =  (1  - sMX,H + 1 share)/(n + 1). Clearly this amount is maximized if sMX,H is 
minimized,  i.e.  when  sMX H  = 0.5  +  1  share.  Substituting  this  value  into  the  , 
preceding  expression  for  sM H  yields:  sM H  = O.S/(n  +  1).  Furthermore  (CII)  ,  , 
simplifies to:  1 - SH':;; sM H which implies that sM H is maximized when the L.H.S.  ,  , 
of the condition is maximized or when SH is chosen so that 1 - SH =  sM H- Hence SH  , 
=  1 - O.S/(n + 1). 
Finally, when the values for sM Hand sM X from proposition 1 are substituted into  ,  , 
the first two constraints of the programming problem of appendix B, one obtains: 
(N-I)/N + N shares> Sx and 
(N-1)2/N2 + (N-I) shares + (N-I)*n/(N2*n).:;; Sx 